Европейская денежная система
law" consistent with the Basle Committee's rules and with the 1997 Core
Principles of Banking Supervision.
The country-specific, non-harmonised, part of the platform is also
quite relevant and very diversified. It includes, among other things, the
different organisational arrangements for the conduct of banking
supervision (central bank, separate agency or a mixed arrangement); the
tools used by banking supervisors (e.g. supervisory reporting, on-site
inspections); provisions for the liquidation and restructuring of banks;
and the definition and legal protection of financial instruments and
contracts. Even the key notion of a regulated market is harmonised only to
a very limited extent.
15. Such "neutrality" and "incompleteness" on the part of the EU
legislator with respect to key aspects that are normally incorporated in
the regulatory framework is a unique feature of EU banking regulations and
is likely to trigger a deregulatory process, pushed by competition among
the national systems and the different financial centres in the euro area,
and beyond that in the EU. Against the background of the increasing
competition and other changes in the banking industry, one can expect that
the regulatory platform will evolve in the years to come. Additional EU
legislation may prove necessary to complete and strengthen the harmonised
part. One important part of common legislation, namely the draft Directive
on liquidation and re-organisation measures for credit institutions, has
not yet been adopted and, indeed, has been stalled for years. This
Directive is needed to bring legal certainty to the framework for banking
crisis management. In this regard, it would be useful for the Eurosystem,
if necessary, to be able to exclude counterparties from the single monetary
policy on prudential grounds. Also, the non-harmonised part of the platform
will come under pressure to converge, as I have just mentioned, through the
process of "regulatory competition". Like any other rapidly changing
industry, the banking sector will require careful attention by regulators.
As indicated earlier, the ECB will have the possibility of contributing to
the rule-making process through its advisory tasks under Article 105 (4) of
the Treaty and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.
16. On the whole, and taking a euro area perspective, the legislative-
cum-regulatory platform of the banking industry, although rather unusual
and very diversified in comparison with those of most currency
jurisdictions, does not seem to present loopholes or inconsistencies that
may hamper the pursuit of systemic stability. Seen from the point of view
of the regulatory burden, it is a light system. It will become even more so
if competition among national banking systems and financial centres
encourages national regulators to free their banks from regulatory burdens
that are not required by the EU Directives. Conversely, seen from the point
of view of its flexibility, i.e. how quickly it can adapt to new
situations, it is, on the contrary, a heavy system. This is the case both
because the EU legislative process is slow (three years or even longer may
be needed to pass Directives) and, perhaps more importantly, because many
provisions are embodied in the Community primary legislation (i.e.
Directives) rather than in Community secondary legislation (amendable
through simpler comitology procedures).
The establishment of EMU does not seem to determine a need for
revising the pillars of the current legal framework. What seems to be
necessary, however, is a more flexible legislative procedure which allows
for a faster and more effective revision of Community legislation, whenever
needed in relation to market developments.
17. Let me now turn to the execution of banking supervision. It
should immediately be recalled that supervision, contrary to regulation, is
a national task, exercised by what the jargon of the Directives calls the
"competent authority". Since the euro area has adopted a separation
approach between supervisory and central banking functions, it is natural
to examine first the functioning of the "euro area supervisor" (i.e. the co-
operative system of national supervisors) and then turn to the tasks and
needs of the "euro area central banker" (i.e. the Eurosystem).
18. The euro area supervisor can be regarded as a rather peculiar
entity composed of national agencies working in three modes: stand-alone,
bilateral and multilateral. Let us briefly examine each of them.
The stand-alone mode is the one in which the supervisor exclusively
operates in the national (or even local) context. Today it is by far the
most predominant mode. In most cases, this approach is sufficient to
achieve the objectives of banking supervision because most banks in Europe
are operating in a context that does not even reach the nationwide market
of the country of origin. Such a decentralised model is even more effective
because it allows the efficient use of information that may not be
available far from the market in which the bank operates. That is why it is
actually applied even within countries. In Italy, for example, over 600 of
the 900 licensed credit institutions at end-1998 were entirely supervised
by the Banca d'Italia branch of the town in which the bank is licensed.
The bilateral mode involves co-operation between two supervisory
agencies. It is used for cross-border supervision of the same type of
financial institutions, such as credit institutions, or the supervision of
different types of financial institutions operating in the same market,
such as credit institutions and securities firms. The instrument that has
been devised to organise bilateral co-operation between banking supervisors
is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). With the implementation of the
2nd Banking Co-ordination Directive, the Member States began to negotiate
extensively MoUs in order to establish the necessary co-operation between
"home" and "host country" authorities to supervise efficiently institutions
that have cross-border activities or foreign country establishments.
By the end of 1997, 78 bilateral MoUs had been signed between the EEA
banking supervisory authorities. The key aims of MoUs are to establish a
regular exchange of information between national supervisory authorities.
While the "gateways" for the exchange of information have been laid down in
Community legislation, MoUs provide a practical framework for communication
to be carried out between supervisors. Moreover, MoUs define procedures and
reciprocal commitments between pairs of EU supervisors related to the
various parts of the supervisory process, such as establishment procedures
and on-site examinations.
Finally, the multilateral mode is the one in which a group of
supervisors works collectively as, say, a single consolidated supervisor.
Such a mode is required when the problems involved are area-wide. They may
be area-wide for a number of reasons with regard to the institutions, or
groups, involved: their dimension; their linkages with a number of
different markets in various countries; the role they play in the payment
system or in other "systemic" components of the market, etc. Multilateral
co-operation can also enhance the quality of supervision by examining
common macroeconomic influences on the banking system and common trends in
the financial system that may not be revealed from the national perspective
Today, the Banking Supervision Committee is the key forum for
multilateral co-operation. It is composed of representatives of the banking
supervisory authorities of the EU countries, either forming part of the
respective NCB or separate bodies. The Banking Supervision Committee's main
functions are the promotion of a smooth exchange of information between the
Eurosystem and national supervisory authorities and co-operation among EU
supervisory authorities. Another forum for dealing with the requirements of
the multilateral mode is the Groupe de Contact, a group of EU banking
supervisory authorities which, for many years, has discussed individual
banking cases in a multilateral way, but at a lower organisational level
than the high-level Banking Supervision Committee.
19. So far, the need to develop the multilateral mode has been
relatively limited, as the emergence of a single banking market in the
European Union has been slow and the euro was not yet in place. Thus, the
fact that the multilateral mode has not gone, for the moment, beyond
periodic discussions among supervisors and occasional industry-wide
analyses should not be a cause for concern.
I am convinced, however, that in the future the needs will change and
the multilateral mode will have to deepen substantially. Over time such a
mode will have to be structured to the point of providing the banking
industry with a true and effective collective euro area supervisor. It will
have to be enhanced to the full extent required for banking supervision in
the euro area to be as prompt and effective as it is within a single
There are no legal impediments to that. The existing legislation,
whether Community or national, permits all the necessary steps to be made.
Information can be pooled; reporting requirements and examination practices
can be developed and standardised; common databases can be created; joint
teams can be formed; and analyses of developments across the whole banking
system can be conducted. The Community legislation providing for the
unconstrained exchange of confidential information between supervisors does
not distinguish between bilateral and multilateral co-operation, but the
common interpretation is that it covers both modes. It will be the task of
the Banking Supervision Committee, for its part, to develop the
multilateral mode among EU banking supervisors.
20. If the above concerns primarily the euro area supervisor, what
about the euro area central banker, i.e. the Eurosystem? The euro area
central banker has neither direct responsibility for supervising banks nor
for bank stability. It is, however, no stranger in this land. It has a
vital interest in a stable and efficient banking industry; it is,
therefore, keen to see its action complemented with an effective conduct of
the supervisory functions by the competent authorities; it needs a clear
and precise knowledge of the state of the euro area's banking industry as a
whole and of its major individual players; and it may have a role to play,
as we shall see, in the management of crises.
For the Eurosystem, natural reference models are provided by the
central banks of countries that apply the separation approach, for example:
Germany before the euro; the United Kingdom after the creation of the
Financial Services Authority; or Japan. In all these cases the central bank
has a well-developed expertise in the micro and macro-prudential field;
each distinctively plays a role in the macro-prudential field by addressing
threats to the stability of the banking system and analysing the soundness
of the structural features of the system. For their own purposes, these
central banks also have precise and comprehensive information about the
banks in their respective country. This is obtained either from performing
practical supervisory duties, as in the case of the Bank of Japan or the
Bundesbank; or from the national supervisory authority; or through direct
contacts with the banking industry, as in the case of the Bank of England.
The Banking Supervision Committee is in a good position to co-operate
with the Eurosystem in the collection of information. Indeed, the so-called
BCCI Directive has removed the legal obstacles to the transmission of
confidential information from competent supervisory authorities to "central
banks and other bodies with a similar function in their capacity as
monetary authorities". This includes national central banks and the ECB. Of
course, the provision of supervisory information is voluntary and its
development will have to be based on an agreed view of the central banking
requirements the Eurosystem will have in this field.
V. CRISIS MANAGEMENT
21. In normal circumstances central banking and prudential
supervision have an arm's length distance between them. In crisis
situations, however, they need to act closely together, often in co-
operation with other authorities as well. Charles Goodhart and Dirk
Schoenmaker have made here at the London School of Economics a valuable
contribution to analysing the handling of major banking problems in the
history of industrial countries. One of their conclusions is that, in most
instances, central banks have indeed been involved. Banking problems are so
close to monetary stability, payment system integrity and liquidity
management that this finding hardly comes as a surprise. The advent of the
euro will not, by itself, change this state of affairs.
22. When discussing crisis management, it should not be forgotten
that, while central banks have a direct and unique role to play when the
creation of central bank money is involved, this represents just one
category of emergency action. Another category refers to the injection - by
politically liable Finance Ministries - of taxpayers' money into ailing or
insolvent credit institutions. There is also a third, market-based,
category, consisting of the injection of private money by banks or other
market participants. These three typologies of emergency action all require
the involvement of policy-makers, but they must not be mixed up when
evaluating the existing arrangements. Therefore, before discussing the much
debated question of the lender-of-last-resort, let me briefly comment on
the two, probably less controversial cases where central bankers are not
the providers of extra funds.
23. First, the "private money solution". This market-based approach
is clearly the preferable option, not just to save public funds and avoid
imbalances in public finances, but also to reduce the moral hazard problem
generated by public assistance to ailing institutions. Indeed, policy-
makers are increasingly aware that the expectations of a helping hand can
increase financial institutions' risk appetite in the first place. However,
even when a market-based solution is possible, on the grounds of private
interest, private parties may not be able to reach a solution for lack of
information or co-ordination. Public authorities have therefore an active
role to play for the market solution to materialise. The recent rescue
package co-ordinated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to prevent the
LTCM hedge fund from collapsing is a good example of public intervention
being used to achieve a private solution.
Acting as a "midwife" in brokering a private sector deal is not the
only example of managing crises without injecting public funds. Banking
supervisors have at their disposal a number of tools to intervene at the
national level to limit losses and prevent insolvency when a bank faces
difficulties. These tools include special audits, business restrictions and
various reorganisation measures.
In the euro area, national supervisors and central banks will
continue to be the key actors in the pursuit of market-based solutions to
crises. The Eurosystem, or the Banking Supervision Committee, would become
naturally involved whenever the relevance of the crisis required it.
24. Second, the "taxpayers' money solution". Taxpayers have been
forced to shoulder banks' losses in the past, when public authorities felt
that otherwise the failure of a large portion of a country's banking system
or of a single significant institution would have disrupted financial
stability and caused negative macroeconomic consequences. In such instances
banks have been taken over by the state, or their bad assets have been
transferred to a separate public entity to attract new private investment
in the sound part of the otherwise failed banks. The US savings & loans
crisis of the 1980s, the banking crises in Scandinavia in the early 1990s
and the current banking crises in Japan and some East-Asian countries are
examples of system-wide insolvency problems that have triggered taxpayers'
support. Crйdit Lyonnais and Banco di Napoli are recent examples of public
support to individual insolvency problems.
The introduction of the euro leaves crisis management actions
involving taxpayers' money practically unaffected. The option of injecting
equity or other funds remains available for the Member States, since these
operations are not forbidden by the Treaty. Nevertheless, the European
Commission will be directly involved in scrutinising and authorising such
actions, since any state aid must be compatible with the Community's
competition legislation. This happened, for example, in the cases of Banco
di Napoli and ‚[pic]Crйdit Lyonnais.
The handling of solvency crises is not within the competence of the
national central banks nor that of the ECB, although national central banks
are likely to be consulted, as they have been in the past.
25. Third, the "central bank money solution". This is the lender-of-
last-resort issue that has brought the Eurosystem under vigorous criticism
by distinguished academics and the IMF's Capital Markets Division of the
Research Department. The criticism has been that the alleged absence of a
clear and transparent mechanism to act in an emergency raises doubts in the
markets about the ability of the Eurosystem to handle crisis situations. It
is said that the uncertainty generated by the present arrangements would
entail new risks, including the possibility of investors requiring an
additional risk premium at times of financial market volatility and,
ultimately, of the credibility of EMU being damaged. Two examples of these
concerns deserve an explicit mention. The IMF "Report on Capital Markets",
September 1998, stated that "it is unclear how a bank crisis would be
handled under the current institutional framework …which is not likely to
be sustainable". Similarly, the first report of the CEPR (Centre for
Economic Policy Research) on monitoring the ECB entitled "The ECB: Safe at
Any Speed?" expressly suggested that the Eurosystem lacks crisis management
capacity and is too rigid to pass the A-Class test to keep the vehicle on
the road at the first steep turn in financial market conditions in Europe.
26. My response to this criticism is threefold. To my mind, the
criticism reflects a notion of lender-of-last-resort operations that is
largely outdated; it underestimates the Eurosystem's capacity to act; and,
finally, it represents too mechanistic a view of how a crisis is, and
should be, managed in practice.
27. The notion of a central bank's lender-of-last-resort function
dates back more than 120 years, to the time of Bagehot. This notion refers
to emergency lending to institutions that, although solvent, suffer a rapid
liquidity outflow due to a sudden collapse in depositors' confidence, i.e.
a classic bank run. A bank could be exposed to depositors' panic even if
solvent because of the limited amount of bank liquidity and an information
asymmetry between the depositors and the bank concerning the quality of
bank's assets that do not have a secondary market value.
Nowadays and in our industrial economies, runs may occur mainly in
textbooks. They have little relevance in reality because, since Bagehot,
many antidotes have been adopted: deposit insurance, the regulation of
capital adequacy and large exposures, improved licensing and supervisory
standards all contribute to the preservation of depositors' confidence and
minimise the threat of a contagion from insolvent to solvent institutions.
A less unlikely case is a rapid outflow of uninsured interbank
liabilities. However, since interbank counterparties are much better
informed than depositors, this event would typically require the market to
have a strong suspicion that the bank is actually insolvent. If such a
suspicion were to be unfounded and not generalised, the width and depth of
today's interbank market is such that other institutions would probably
replace (possibly with the encouragement of the public authorities as
described above) those which withdraw their funds. It should be noted, in
this respect, that the emergence of the single euro money market lowers
banks' liquidity risk, because the number of possible sources of funds is
now considerably larger than in the past.
Given all of these contingencies, the probability that a modern bank
is solvent, but illiquid, and at the same time lacks sufficient collateral
to obtain regular central bank funding, is, in my view, quite small. The
textbook case for emergency liquidity assistance to individual solvent
institutions has, as a matter of fact, been a most rare event in industrial
countries over the past decades.
28. What if this rare event were nevertheless to occur and cause a
systemic threat? The clear answer is that the euro area authorities would
have the necessary capacity to act. This is not only my judgement, but also
that of the Eurosystem, whose decision-making bodies have, as you can
imagine, carefully discussed the matter. I am not saying that we are, or
shall be, infallible; no one can claim such a divine quality. I am saying
that there are neither legal-cum-institutional, nor organisational, nor
Рефераты бесплатно, реферат бесплатно, сочинения, курсовые работы, реферат, доклады, рефераты, рефераты скачать, рефераты на тему, курсовые, дипломы, научные работы и многое другое.
При использовании материалов - ссылка на сайт обязательна.